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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the efficiency and distributional effects of trade liberalization in the 
context of fiscal reform in Vietnam. The analysis is performed using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Vietnamese economy calibrated to late-1990s production and 
household data. It is a standard small open price taking economy model with CES nested 
demand and CES production functions.  
Results show that the efficiency gains (in term of aggregate welfare measure) from the 
combined tax and tariff reform are modest, but significant redistribution occurs among rich 
and poor household groups and between urban and rural populations. Careful analyses show 
that the sharpness of the redistribution falls as the country moves from only trade 
liberalization to combined tax and tariff reforms. Finally, additional simulations have been 
performed to make clearer the transmission mechanisms linking tariff policy to income 
distribution and household welfare. A key finding is that trade liberalization is pro-rich due 
essentially to the higher share of imported goods consumed by the rich.  
 
Keywords: CGE model, counterfactual simulations, distributional effects, efficiency, 
household welfare, tariff, tax reform, trade liberalization, VAT, Vietnam. 
 
JEL code: R13, R20, C68, D58, D63.Introduction 
Trade liberalization is an important issue in Vietnam as it works to comply with the 
requirements for joining the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of trade 
liberalization in Vietnam on economic efficiency (at macro level) as well as on the welfare of 
households ranked by expenditure group.  
The structure of model used is fairly standard along the lines of Dervis, et. al (1985), 
Devarajan and Lewis (1990), Shoven and Whalley (1992), Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr 
(1993) and Ghosh, Hutton and Whalley (1999). However, some degree of novelty lies in the 
use of fixed factors and the application of the Armington (1969) structure both in production 
and consumption within the small economy assumptions. We use Vietnamese data for 1996 
to calibrate the model and to perform a series of counterfactual experiments to analyze the 
impacts of tariff reductions and VAT reform at the macro and micro levels. 
The model is used in counterfactual mode by replacing the existing (1996) Vietnamese 
tariff structure by a yield preserving VAT. Four VAT rates in the ratio of 0:1:2:4 are 
endogenously determined. Trade balance conditions hold in both the base and new 
equilibria. 
We have run several additional counterfactual scenarios to highlight the channels of 
impacts of trade liberalization policy on income distribution and household welfare. The 
particular channels are via remuneration of specific factors, consumer prices, and household 
expenditure patterns. 
We begin with an overview of trade policy, poverty and inequality in Vietnam, before we 
proceed to a detailed description of the model. The remainder of paper is devoted to the 
presentation of counterfactual simulations, discussion of results and concluding remarks. 
  1Trade Policies 
Tax reform in Vietnam is ongoing with a value added tax (VAT) introduced in 1999. The 
key issue is tariff reform, which is necessary as a part of the country’s commitments prior to 
its integration into AFTA and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement. Tariff 
liberalization is also an indispensable requirement for joining the WTO in the future
1.  
To comply with these requirements the Vietnamese government announced a tariff 
schedule in early 1998. Vietnam committed to maximize the list of goods with a tariff rate of 5 
percent in 2003 and expand the list of goods with 0 percent tariff in 2006. Table 1 provides 
estimates of current effective rates of protection of Vietnam.  
 
Table 1: Effective rates of protection (ERP), 1996 
Model Sector  ERP  Model Sector  ERP 
D1 3.7 D10 2.3
1. Paddy  E1 0.8 10. Chemicals and printing  E10 0.4
D2 9.8 D11 18.0
2. Other  agriculture  E2 2.4 11. Textiles and garments  E11 9.5
D3 0.7 D12 18.2
3. Forestry.  E3 0.0 12. Electricity, gas and water  E12 3.1
D4 4.5 13. Construction  D13  0.0
4. Aquatic  goods  E4 1.1 D14 0.0
D5 3.6 14. Hotel and restauration  E14 0.0
5. Mining  E5 0.4 D15 0.0
D6 7.6
15. Transport and 
communication  E15 0.0
6. Alcoholic  beverages  E6 1.6 D16 0.0
D7 7.6 16. Financial services  E16 0.0
7. Food  Manufacturing  E7 1.0 D17 0.0
D8 7.3
17. Non-financial private and 
public services  E17 0.0
8.  Ceramics and paper  E8 0.9   
D9 13.4     
9. Construction material  E9 0.2     
Sources: GSO; General Department of Taxes and authors’ estimates. 
Notes: D: Production for domestic sale; E: Production for export. 
  
Currently, tax revenues are around 20 percent of GDP and constitute more than 90 percent 
of the State budget. Tariffs, in turn, represent 15-20 percent of total tax revenue (Table 2).  
                     
1 One significant step recently made in this direction, after a prolonged discussion, is the US-Vietnam 
Trade Agreement signed on July 13, 2000 in Washington, DC. 
  2Table 2: Government revenue 1997-1998 
Total revenue from all taxes and fees  100 percent
- Corporate  profit  10.1
-  Labor use tax  20.5
-  Capital use tax  5.4
-  Commodity input tax  25.2
- Export  tax  5.4
- Import  tax  14.3
- Sales  tax  17.4
-  Household income tax  1.70
Sources: General Department of Taxes, 2000, I/O Table 1996, the SNA 1997 and authors’ estimates. 
Vietnam expects that the tariffs on ASEAN imports will be removed by 2006 and those 
on APEC imports by 2020. Following WTO regulations, tariffs should be the last protective 
barriers removed by states. This implies that tariff reductions should be accompanied by the 
removal of non–tariff barriers (NTBs), such as import quotas, fixation of the basic import price 
to determine the tariff, application of higher domestic taxes on imported goods, fees on 
imported products, and subsidies in the form of tax reduction or tax exemptions for 
domestically produced goods. We do not include NTBs to avoid undue complexity and 
instead focus our analysis on the impacts of tariff policy
2.  
Poverty and Inequality 
Results from the 1997-98 Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) indicate that, 
although living standards have generally improved in the last five years, the gap remains very 
significant between urban and rural populations (see Table 3).  
                     
2 More details on this subject, including the problem of quantitative estimation of tariff equivalents of 
NTBs can be found in Huy et al. (2000A, 2000B). Recently, Ghosh and Whalley (2001) also arrived at 
interesting results on the effects of export quotas and price controls for the rice market in Vietnam. 
  3Table 3: Sources of Household Income 1996 

















H1U 0.8  926 6.0 3.0 4.8 3.0
H1R 19.2  804 3.8 1.5 3.1  2.0
H2U 1.4  1550 7.5 5.9 6.5 6.0
H2R 18.6  1487 5.5 2.1 4.8  2.0
H3U 2.5  2235 8.3 7.5 7.2 7.0
H3R 17.5  2173 7.1 4.7 6.5  5.0
H4U 5.2  3360 11.2 7.7 9.3 8.0
H4R 14.9  3257 8.4 10.0 8.3 10.0
H5U 12.6  9617 26.7 29.7 32.8 30.0
H5R 7.4  6625 15.6 27.9 16.8  27.0
Total 100.0    100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Vietnam I/O Table 1996 (GSO, 1999); VLSS 1997-1998, GSO (2000); General Department 
of Taxes. Notes: H1: poorest quintile, H5: richest quintile, U = urban, R = rural. 
 
According to the survey, the annual income per capita of the top quintile is 7,905 
thousand VND (roughly $US 680), or 10.5 times higher than that of the bottom quintile. If the 
top and bottom deciles are compared, this gap is doubled. We also note that the gaps vary 
according to the source of household income. Consumption patterns are also very different 
between the poor and rich household groups (Table 4). 
Table 4: Household consumption patterns 1996 
Model  Sector  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
Paddy D1  0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Other agriculture  D2  0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Forestry. D3  0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.11
Aquatic goods  D4  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14
Agriculture   0.17 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34
Mining D5  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05
Alcoholic beverages  D6  0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.18
Food Manufacturing  D7  0.13 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
Ceramics and paper  D8  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Construction material  D9  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Chemicals and printing  D10  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14
Textiles and garments  D11  0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Electricity, gas and water  D12  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04
Construction D13  0.21 0.19 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
Industry   0.57 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.58
Hotel and restoration  D14  0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Transport and communication  D15  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Financial services  D16  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Non-financial private and 
public services  D17  0.17 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Services   0.24 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08
 Total  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Computed from the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) prepared by the authors. 
  4Description of the Model 
The model structure and specifications 
The CGE model provided in this paper is a small, price-taking open economy model. 
Before entering into the details of different blocks of the model, its general features are 
described through a circular flow relation in Figure 1. 
There are 4 blocks that form the economy; Households (10 household groups), 
Production (33 goods and services sectors, among which 17 are for domestic sale and 16 for 
export), Government and the rest of the World (ROW).  The benchmark data set used in 
model calibration is for the base year 1996. A detailed social accounting matrix (SAM) 
prepared using the latest I/O Table (1996) and the 1997-98 VLSS serve as the main data 
sources. 
Production 
The model incorporates 33 production sectors (17 for domestic sale and 16 for export) 
aggregated from the 97 sectors identified in the Vietnam I/O Table 1996. Production market 
characteristics used in model calibration are reported in Table 5. There is only one non-
traded sector (Sector G13: Construction). All other sectors are traded and decomposed into 
production for domestic sale (Di) and production for export (Ei). 
The choice of sectoral aggregation aims to capture the key characteristics of the 
Vietnamese economy. Lack of data limits further disaggregation. Each sector of the model 
produces goods using both primary factors (including capital, labor, foreign capital and 
sector-specific factors) and intermediate (domestically produced or imported) inputs. 











































  6 Table 5: Production and factor markets 1996 
Value added  Capital VA  Labor VA  Output 
Model Sector  Rate (VA/XS)  Share  Share  Share  Share  Value 
 D1  59.3 11.1 1.3 14.1  8.3  48959
Paddy     E1  59.3 0.2 0.0 0.2  0.1  834
D2 71.4 4.8 1.2 6.6  3.0  17728
Other agriculture  E2 71.2 3.8 1.0 5.3  2.4  14070
D3 59.2 6.3 1.8 7.8  4.7  28042
Forestry.  E3 58.9 0.3 0.1 0.4  0.3  1513
D4 61.1 3.5 1.3 4.4  2.5  15031
Aquatic goods  E4 60.6 0.7 0.3 0.9  0.5  2998
D5 51.9 2.1 5.1 0.7  1.8  10712
Mining  E5 54.5 4.3 9.5 1.3  3.4  20439
D6 31.9 3.3 4.0 2.3  4.6  27411
Alcoholic beverages  E6 25.9 1.0 1.6 1.0  1.8  10416
D7 10.7 1.7 1.9 1.6  6.8  40338
Food Manufacturing  E7 10.2 0.5 0.6 0.5  2.1  12462
D8 17.6 2.5 3.0 2.3  6.2  37013
Ceramics and paper  E8 19.0 0.7 0.8 0.6  1.6  9386
D9 26.8 1.7 3.5 0.8  2.8  16602
Construction material  E9 26.6 0.1 0.2 0.0  0.1  741
D10 21.4 2.3 2.8 1.8  4.7  27699
Chemicals and printing  E10 20.0 0.3 0.4 0.3  0.7  3848
D11 23.8 1.0 1.1 1.0  1.8  10758
Textiles and garments  E11 23.5 1.8 2.1 1.9  3.4  20329
D12 43.7 2.4 2.2 2.6  2.4  14483
Electricity, gas and water  E12 47.6 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  30
Construction D13  31.2 6.4 8.3 6.3  9.1  53710
D14 69.7 16.5 31.0 11.9  10.5  62057
Hotel and restauration  E14 69.1 1.5 3.0 1.2  1.0  5768
D15 54.7 4.3 5.5 2.8  3.5  20477 Transport and 
communication  E15 54.5 0.4 0.5 0.3  0.3  1789
D16 70.2 0.9 1.4 0.9  0.6  3298
Financial services  E16 70.7 0.8 1.3 0.8  0.5  3034
D17 65.1 12.1 3.2 16.4  8.2  48838 Non-financial private and 
public services  E17  64.6 0.6 0.2 0.9  0.4  2575
 Total   100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  593388
Sources: GSO; General Department of Taxes and authors’ estimates. 
Notes: D: Production for domestic sale; E: Production for export. 
 
The production functions used are of the double nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) form (Figure 2). At the bottom level, primary factors are aggregated by 
CES function into composite factor inputs. Similarly, all intermediate goods including 
imported goods are nested into composite intermediate goods inputs by a CES function. 
Intermediate goods and factor inputs are then aggregated at the upper level of the production 
function to obtain final output. Factor and intermediate good demands are determined from 
the first order conditions of cost minimization (see Shoven and Whalley, 1992). Note that for 
both the supply and demand sides of the model, we adopt the small country assumption. 
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The parameters of the model are calibrated. There are no elasticity estimates available 
for the Vietnamese economy. Thus, the production side elasticity values used are based on 
Chia, Wahba and Whalley (1992), which they adopted in their work on the Cote d’Ivoire 
Model. These values are shown in Table 8. On the production side, the elasticities of 
substitution between composite inputs (factor input and good input) are naturally lower than 
the elasticities of substitution between factors or between inputs. We assume that the bottom 
level elasticities are 1.5 times greater than the upper level elasticities. 
Households 
In the model, 10 household groups are identified according to their classification (by 
level of expenditure) in the VLSS. The survey data indicates five household quintiles. These 
quintile groups are decomposed into urban and rural households using information from the 
GSO survey data.  
Households receive income in the form of wages and returns from other factors they hold 
as well as transfers from the government. The model remains static and considers neither 
savings nor investment. Thus, household disposable income is entirely spent on consumption. 
Each household has a double nested CES utility function to be maximized subject to 
the household budget constraint (Figure 3). At the lower level, Armington differentiation 
between domestically produced and imported consumption goods is used. At the upper level, 
  8composites of domestic and imports are aggregated to determine the level of utility. In the 
model, final demands of composite goods by source (imported or domestic) for each 
household group are derived from the first order conditions of utility maximization.  
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Elasticity values used for the upper level of the nests are based on our assumptions 
and in line with central tendency estimates available in Shoven and Whalley (1992), Piggot 
and Whalley (1985), Marques (1990) and Orcutt (1950). The convention is again followed 
that the lower level elasticities are 1.5 times that of the upper level ones (Perroni and 
Whalley, 1996). Upper level elasticities are presented in Table 6. Several sensitivity tests 
were undertaken on the elasticity parameters used in the central case model specification 
and showed that the results were robust. 
 
Table 6: Consumption side elasticities of substitution  
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Urban  0.94 0.94 1.26 1.56 1.56 
Rural  0.75 0.75 1.01 1.25 1.25 
Sources: Authors assumption based on Shoven and Whalley (1992), Piggot and Whalley (1985), 
Marques (1990) and Orcutt (1950). 
Equilibrium conditions 
Equilibrium is attained by endogenously determining prices of factors and domestic 
goods and assuming full market clearing and zero profit conditions for each of 33 sectors. 
  9Simulation Results 
Base case 
In the base case, we simulate trade reforms to comply with the AFTA and WTO 
requirements that no tariff be higher than 5 percent. The simulation exercise is performed by 
reducing all tariffs that are higher than 5 percent, to 5 percent and keeping other tariffs 
unchanged.  
We also replace existing sales taxes by four yield-preserving VAT rates in the ratio 
(0:1:2:4) applicable to commodities classified into four groups, where the rates are endogenously 
determined by the equal yield condition. The four groups are, in increasing order of VAT rates, 
basic agricultural activities (0), other agriculture and mining (1), manufacturing and services (2) 
and hotel, restauration, tourism, wine and other luxuries (4). This captures the fact that Vietnam 
introduced a VAT system in 1999 with rates of 0, 5, 10 and 20 percent applicable to the four 
groups of commodities identified. 
The combined effects of the VAT (sales tax reform) and tariff reductions are evaluated 
using money metric measures of utility, namely Hicksian Equivalent Variations (EVs) and 
Compensating Variations (CVs). The results indicate a modest welfare gain of 0.28 percent 
of national income from the combined tariff and sales tax reform for the economy as a whole 
(Table 7). 
However, these are accompanied by a sharp redistribution effect both between the rural 
and urban population and between the poor and the rich. The rich groups (H4 and H5) benefit in 
both the rural and urban populations. Moreover, the richest groups (H5) have the largest gain at 
0.43 percent of income. For the second richest groups (H4), the urban population gains much 
more than the rural population. The poorest groups (H1) also gain, but by half as much as the 
richest groups (0.2 versus 0.4 percent). The second poorest groups (H2) lose out in both urban 
and rural areas: 0.02 percent and 0.08 percent of income, respectively. 
 
  10Table 7: Welfare impacts from sale tax and tariff reform in Vietnam (1997) 
Household Groups by Consumption Expenditure Base  Case ASB AS1 AS2  AS3  AS4  AS5  AS6-1 AS6-2
H1U (poorest)  0.19 -0.25 0.30 0.30 0.16 0.13  -0.02  0.21 0.10
H1R (poorest)  0.21 -0.11 0.31 0.31 0.17 0.23 0.05  0.21 0.11
H2U  -0.02 -0.47 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14  0.04 -0.04
H2R -0.08 -0.53 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.15 -0.39  -0.06 -0.15
H3U 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.38  0.22 0.06
H3R -0.01 -0.32 0.06 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07  0.01 -0.08
H4U 0.34 0.59 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.88 1.19  0.32 0.19
H4R 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.46 0.65  0.21 0.00
H5U (richest)  0.43 0.82 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.94 1.31 0.40 0.27
H5R (richest)  0.43 0.83 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.86 1.22 0.39 0.23
Aggregate Welfare Measure                      
Sum of EV over household as percent of base income 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.57 0.77  0.27 0.14
Sum of CV over household as percent of base income 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.58 0.79  0.27 0.14
VAT Rate by commodity groups                      
Basic agricultural activities  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Other agriculture and mining  2.40 3.51 2.40 2.40 2.45  3.17 3.57  2.42 2.49
Manufacturing and services  4.90 7.02 4.90 4.90 4.90 6.34 7.13  4.84 4.97
Hotel, restaurant, tourism, wine, etc…  9.80 14.05 9.80 9.80 9.80 12.67 14.26  9.68 9.94
Base Case: All tariffs above 5 percent set to 5 percent, tariffs below 5 percent remain unchanged and 
endogenous yield preserving VAT. 
Additional simulations (AS) (Note: Simulations AS1 – AS5 are with hypothetical benchmark) 
ASB (base case): Elimination of all tariffs and yield preserving endogenous VAT applicable to four 
groups of commodities in the ratio (0:1:2:4). 
AS1: Average import ratios in consumption applied to all households. 
AS2: AS1 plus average sector-specific to total factor endowments applied to all households. 
AS3: The same consumption structure by sector for all household groups. 
AS4: The ratio in endowment between labor & capital is the same for all households. 
AS5: Doubling initial tariffs in benchmark. 
AS6-1: Capital of domestic sectors is immobile; AS6-2: Capital of all sectors is immobile. 
 
The changes in consumer prices (Table 8) due to the tariff and tax reforms affect the 
consumption behavior of households and, consequently, their utility and welfare. As an example, 
consider the two poorest urban household groups H1U and H2U (Table 7), which primarily 
consume domestically produced goods. They have the same elasticities of substitution in 
consumption. Reviewing tables 4 and 7, we see that 34 percent of total consumption by the poorest 
group (H1U) is of goods for which prices have fallen
3 while 54 percent is of goods for which prices 
increased by more than one percent
4. For the second poorest urban household group (H2U), the 
figures are 22 and 53 percent, respectively. Thus the poorest urban household group benefits more 
from price reductions and suffers less from price increases, which explains the result (Table 7-Base 
                     
3 Mining (D5), alcoholic beverages (D6), construction (D13) and transport and communication (D15). 
  11case) that they have a positive EV (0.19 percent), whereas the next poorest household group has a 
negative EV (-0.02 percent). 
Similarly, the model can also explain the differences in welfare effects from trade and tax 
reforms between the two poorest rural household groups namely: H1R (+0.21 percent) and H2R 
(-0.08 percent). In the middle income group (H3), urban households gain by +0.20 percent while 
their rural counterparts lose marginally by -0.01 percent. 
Table 8 also shows changes in prices of domestically produced and imported goods as 
well as in total demand of commodities. After tariff removal, even if the consumer prices of 
imported goods fall, the prices of domestically produced substitutes can rise because of 
higher sales taxes. This is true in the case of other agriculture (D2), Construction material 
(D9), Textiles and garments (D11) and Electricity, gas and water (D12)
5
There is another group of commodities for which the tariffs remain unchanged, but the 
consumer prices (both of imported and of domestically produced goods) increase, again due 
to the combined tariff and VAT reform. This group includes chemicals, printing and other 
industrial products (D10), financial services (D16) and public services (D17). 
In response to the increasing relative price of domestic versus imported goods, 
consumers, notably rich households who consume a larger share of imported goods, shift 
their demand toward imports. In industries where tariffs are reduced, import volumes 
increase. However, imports also increase in sectors for which tariffs do not change, but 
where the VAT rate falls and consequently demand increases. Note, for example, that in the 
mining sector (D5), which has a constant tariff rate of 3.6 percent, the consumer price of 
imported products falls by 9.8 percent and imports increase by 6.7 percent. 
                                                                  
4 In percentage terms, price increases are generally not as important as price reductions: the greatest 
increase is less than 5% for Finance, banking and insurance (D16), and Public services (D17). 
5 Note that sales taxes double, even triple for D11. 
  12Table 8: Effect of trade liberalization on sectoral production (percent) 
 
    Initial Elasticities Sectoral shares     Volume changes (percent)  Price changes (percent) 
Industry    tariff ef ei VAi/VA    Mi/M EXi/EX Mi/Qi VAi Mi Di EXi XSi Pi PDi PMi
D1    3.7 0.30 0.40 10.6 0.1     1.3 -3.4 0.1 0.7   -3.4 0.60 0.60
Paddy  E1          0.8 0.30 0.40 0.2 0.4 0.7 -1.3 -3.5 1.3 -1.3
D2        9.8 0.30 0.40 4.9 1.6   18.4 -1.0 7.1 0.1 -0.9 0.60 2.06 -2.94
Other agriculture  E2        2.4 0.30 0.40 3.9 3.3 12.2  -0.9 2.1 0.9 -0.9
D3          0.7 0.30 0.40 6.5 0.3 2.8 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.43 1.26 0.83
Forestry.  E3          0.0 0.30 0.40 0.4 0.3 1.3 -0.3 0.8 0.3 -0.3
D4          4.5 0.30 0.40 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.09 0.31 0.22
Aquatic goods  E4          1.1 0.30 0.40 0.7 0.7 2.6 -0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0
AGRICULTURE   30.7 6.8 16.8               
D5          3.6 0.45 0.60 2.0 1.0 5.7 10.7 6.7 14.1 11.1 0.70 -9.17 -9.80
Mining  E5          0.4 0.45 0.60 3.0 4.0 13.8 -8.5 1.7 8.4 -8.4
D6          7.6 0.68 0.90 2.9 2.0 9.6 0.6 4.7 1.8 1.1 0.05 -0.01 -2.44
Alcoholic beverages  E6        1.6 0.68 0.90 1.2 1.5 9.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.1  
D7          7.6 0.60 0.80 2.1 1.1 3.7 -4.3 0.9 -4.2 -4.1 0.53 4.83 1.78
Food Manufacturing  E7          1.0 0.60 0.80 0.7 0.7 10.5 -2.8 -0.8 3.8 -3.8
D8        7.3 0.53 0.70 2.9 27.3   27.3 -1.5 3.2 -1.5 -1.1 -0.50 2.78 1.13
Ceramics and paper  E8      0.9 0.45 0.60 0.9 7.1 10.1  25.4 2.6   26.6 26.6
D9          13.4 0.30 0.40 1.8 1.4 6.5 1.5 6.0 -0.7 1.8 -0.18 2.14 -5.24
Construction material  E9          0.2 0.30 0.40 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2
D10          2.3 0.60 0.80 2.3 14.6 25.3 0.8 1.8 -0.4 1.2 -0.12 1.51 1.62
Chemicals and printing  E10        0.4 0.60 0.80 0.4 3.2 3.6  8.4 2.2 9.0 9.0
D11        18.0 0.30 0.40 1.2 2.6   7.4 2.3 31.6 1.1 2.7 -2.13 0.84 -8.29
Textiles and garments  E11      9.5 0.30 0.40 3.3 5.8 26.2   45.7 29.5   48.2 48.2
D12        18.2 0.30 0.40 2.5 7.7  58.0 1.9 12.3 9.1 2.3 -0.90 0.14 -10.2
Electricity, gas and water  E12        3.1 0.60 0.80 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.5 3.0 2.4 2.4
Construction  D13          0.00 0.30 0.40 7.1 0.0   0.0 2.5 2.8 2.8 -0.48 -0.98
INDUSTRY   34.5 80.5 74.0               
D14        0.00 0.60 0.80 15.7 2.1  13.6 0.1 -0.1 -1.7 0.5 0.80 2.58 1.76
Hotel and restauration  E14        0.00 0.60 0.80 1.4 2.4 4.6  -4.8 2.2 4.7 -4.7
D15        0.00 0.30 0.40 3.5 3.0  34.9 3.5 3.9 5.3 3.9 -0.23 -2.59 -2.36
Transport and communication  E15        0.00 0.30 0.40 0.3 1.2 1.4  1.3 3.4 1.5 1.5
D16        0.00 0.60 0.80 0.9 1.0  12.0 -3.8 -1.2 -4.3 -3.7 0.996 4.94 3.90
Financial services  E16    0.00 0.60 0.80 0.6 1.3 2.0   -24.9 -0.8   24.9 -24.9
D17        0.00 0.30 0.40 12.1 1.7   5.8 -1.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.0 0.24 1.96 1.71
Non-financial private and public services  E17      0.00 0.30 0.40 0.4 0.2 1.3   -43.1 -1.1   44.9 -44.8
SERVICES   34.8 12.7 9.2               
         100.0 100.0 100.0
Di: domestic sales; Ei: exports; ef (ei): elasticities of substitution between factors (inputs); VA: value added; M: import volumes; D: total domestic demand volumes; EXi: 
export volumes; Qi: total consumption; XSi: output volumes; Pi: producer price; PDi: consumer price for domestic goods; PMi: consumer price for imported goods
  13 Details on the sector-wise impacts on output volumes, as well as domestic and import 
prices, are reported in Table 8. The expanding sectors serving the domestic market are mining 
(D5; 11.1 percent output growth), transport and communication (D15; 3.9 percent), construction, 
and textiles and garments (D11; 2.7 percent). On the contrary, other agriculture (D2), ceramics 
and paper (D8), and non-financial public and private services (D17) contract marginally (-1 
percent), while output of paddy (D1), food manufacturing (D6) and financial services (D17) fall by 
roughly 4 percent. This result is quite consistent with the impacts that the Vietnamese economy 
is currently experiencing. 
Much more dramatic impacts of trade liberalization are noted for export sectors such as 
textile and garment (E11) and ceramics and paper (E8), where output increases by 48.2 and 
26.6 percent, respectively, as a result of exchange rate depreciation. 
Simulation with removal of all tariffs 
The base case counterfactual experiment presented in the previous section is taken from 
the Government’s policy agenda in the framework of commitments of Vietnam for joining AFTA. 
In other countries, trade liberalization can signify a complete removal of all tariffs. To facilitate a 
comparative analysis, the authors have also run such a hypothetical scenario. 
The results given in Table 7 (column ASB) show that the whole economy benefits more 
from a complete removal of tariffs: Welfare increases by 0.39 percent of national income, as 
compared to 0.28 percent in the base case. However, the redistribution effect becomes sharper: 
all the poor household groups (H1, H2) lose, whereas all the rich household groups (H4 and H5) 
gain. The richest group H5 has the largest gain: 0.83 percent, almost double that of the base 
case. 
The main channels of transmission remain the same as in the base case. When all tariffs 
are removed, the VAT is increased (see four last rows in Tables 7) to compensate lost tariff 
revenue. In turn, the raising of VAT negatively affects the poorest households (H1, H2 and H3R) 
  14who primarily consume domestic goods and thus do not benefit much from the fall in import 
prices. On the contrary, complete tariff removal considerably benefits the rich households, who 
consume much more imports than domestic goods. 
Decomposition of impacts 
The analysis presented in the previous section leads to preliminary conclusions that the 
impacts of combined tariff and VAT reform on household welfare are via the remuneration of 
fixed factors (particularly immobile capital) and consumer prices. In other words, the welfare of 
each household group depends primarily on differences in its endowment of specific factors and 
its consumption patterns. To verify the importance of each of these channels, we prepare five 
alternative hypothetical benchmarks where, as in the base case, all tariffs above five percent are 
reduced to five percent. In all but the last case, differences between households in one 
dimension are eliminated in order to then examine how the simulation results are affected: 
1.  Equal import consumption ratios by sector (AS1) 
2.  AS1 plus equal ratios of sector-specific to total factor endowments (AS2) 
3.  AS2 plus equal sectoral consumption ratios (AS3) 
4.  Equal capital-labor endowment ratios (AS4) 
5.  Initial tariffs doubled (AS5) 
Equal import consumption ratios: In this simulation we apply the average sectoral 
import ratios in final consumption to all households. In the real benchmark, poor households 
consume a much smaller share of imported goods than rich households. We can see in Table 7 
(column AS1) that the welfare impacts on poor households are considerably improved. The 
poorest groups (H1U and H1R) now have a welfare gain equivalent to about 0.3 percent of their 
income instead of 0.2 percent in the base case. The situation of the next poorest household 
groups (H2 and H3) also improves considerably with the rural households in question going from 
  15a reduction in welfare to an improvement. The welfare gains of the two richest urban and rich 
household groups decline, as their initial import consumption ratios decline by about 0.4 percent 
of their income. Overall, the equalization of import ratios almost entirely eliminates the 
differences in welfare impacts between household groups. 
Equal sector-specific to total factor endowments: In the real benchmark, most of the 
immobile capital belongs to the urban and rich households, while the rural and poor households 
own only small portions of immobile labor. In this simulation, in addition to imposing equal import 
consumption ratios, the benchmark is adjusted so that all household groups have the same 
average sector-specific to total factor endowments. The results of this hypothetical simulation 
(column AS2) show that the EVs remain almost the same as in the hypothetical simulation AS1
6. 
Thus, we conclude that, for the welfare impacts of combined tariff and VAT reform, the ratio in 
consumption between imported and domestic goods, and not the endowment of specific 
immobile factors, plays an essential role. Note also that, in terms of household income (Table 9), 
there are no significant differences between the base case and both of the hypothetical 
simulations AS1 and AS2, indicating that it is the consumer price channel that predominates. 
Equal sectoral consumption ratios: In this third simulation, in addition to the previous 
two adjustments, the same (average) sectoral consumption shares are applied to all households 
(column AS3). In the real benchmark, for example, the share of non-financial services (G17) in 
total consumption is much higher for the poorer household groups (Table 10). We observe in 
Tables 7 and 9 that the welfare and income of all households groups, except the richest urban 
group H5U, increase less than in the benchmark simulation. In terms of redistribution effects 
among the households, there is no improvement in comparison with the real benchmark 
simulation. Thus, combined with the first additional simulation, it can be ascertained that for 
                     
6 We also performed another alternative scenario in which the share of specific factors is equalized, but 
the sectoral import consumption ratios are as in the real benchmark. In this case the household EVs are 
almost the same as in the base case simulation. 
  16these effects the ratio in consumption by household between imported and domestic goods is 
more important than their consumption structure by sector. 
Table 9: Sale tax and tariff reform in Vietnam (1997): Welfare and income impacts 




benchmark  AS1  AS2   AS3  AS4  AS5 
H1U (poorest)  1.06  1.07  1.07  0.99  2.02  2.44 
H1R (poorest)  1.05  1.06  1.06  0.97  2.02  2.41 
H2U 1.15  1.16  1.19  1.08  2.06  2.59 
H2R 1.02  1.03  1.03  0.95  1.99  2.37 
H3U 1.26  1.27  1.22  1.20  2.21  2.83 
H3R 1.11  1.11  1.15  1.02  2.03  2.51 
H4U 1.14  1.14  1.16  1.07  2.20  2.63 
H4R 1.39  1.40  1.32  1.34  2.48  3.11 
H5U (richest)  1.26  1.26  1.27  1.24  2.34  2.88 
H5R (richest)  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.41  2.61  3.27 
Percentage change in 
National income  1.02 1.03 1.03  0.99  1.83 2.22 
 
Equal labor-capital endowments: In this simulation (AS4), the ratio of labor and capital 
endowments is assumed to be the same for all households. The structure of welfare does not 
change: those who lost (or gained) in the real benchmark case, here lose (gain, respectively), 
too (Table 7, column AS4), as the consumption structure of households remains the same as in 
the real benchmark case. The welfare of richer groups (H4 and H5) increases by double, while 
that of poorer groups does not change so much. Thus it can be said that the hypothesis of an 
equal ratio in endowment between labor and capital for all household groups considerably 
reinforces the sharpness of redistribution effects. This implies that in the real benchmark, the 
income effect slightly offsets the consumption effect. 
  17Table 10: Change in consumption pattern under trade liberalization 
Change in prices  Consumption shares 
Sectors 
Share 
M/Q  PD  PC  PM  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10
1.  Paddy  D1  1.3 0.6 0.6   3 4 3 4 2 3 1 2 1 1
2. Other agriculture  D2  18.4 0.6 2.1 -2.9 5 7 6 6  6  5  6  5 5 4
3.  Forestry.  D3  2.8 0.4 1.3 0.8 5 7 6 8 7 7 5 7 5 6
4. Aquatic goods  D4  0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 4 4 4 4  4  4  3  3 2 2
Agriculture          17 22 19 22  19  19  15  17 13 13
5.  Mining  D5  5.7 0.7 -9.2 -9.8 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2
6. Alcoholic beverages  D6  9.6 0.1 0.0 -2.4 9 9 10 9  10  8  7  8 7 7
7. Food Manufacturing  D7  3.7 0.5 4.8 1.8 13 13 18 14  16  13  12  12 8 11
8. Ceramics and paper  D8  27.3 -0.5 2.8 1.1 4 5 6 6  7  8  13  12 16 14
9. Construction material  D9  6.5 -0.2 2.1 -5.2 0 1 0 1  0  0  1  1 1 1
10. Chemicals and printing  D10 25.3 -0.1 1.5 1.6 3 4 5 5  4  5  3  6 1 1
11. Textiles and garments  D11 7.4 -2.1 0.8 -8.3 3 4 4 5  4  4  3  4 2 3
12. Electricity, gas and water  D12 58.0 -0.9 0.1 -10.2 1 0 2 0 3 1 2 1 3 2
13. Construction  D13 0.0 -0.5 -1.0   21 19 9 14  8 16 17 12 19 18
Industry           55 59 58 58 56 58 62 59 62 63
14. Hotel and restauration  D14 13.6 0.8 2.6 1.8 6 4 7 6  8  8  8  8 9 7
15. Transport and communication  D15 34.9 -0.2 -2.6 -2.4 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
16.  Financial services  D16 12.0 1.0 4.9 3.9 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
17. Non-financial services  D17 5.8 0.2 2.0 1.7 17 13 15 14  15  13  13  14 15 14
Services    24 18 24 20 25 23 23 24 27 24
PDi: Producer price, PCi: Consumer price for domestic goods; PMi: Consumer price for imported goods; 
Mi/Qi: Share of import in local consumption 
 
Doubling of all initial tariffs: With the same idea as simulation ASB of analyzing the 
effects of stronger tariff reduction, we first double the initial tariffs (to obtain a hypothetical 
benchmark) and then repeat our earlier simulation, i.e. reduce to five percent all tariffs that are 
higher (column AS5 of Table 7). Results of this simulation indicate that welfare gains are much 
bigger overall. Only the richer household categories, who consume relatively more imported 
goods, benefit, whereas the poor households see their welfare decrease with respect to the base 
case as they are hit by an even larger increase in VAT rates. In general (except the poorest 
group which is now totally disadvantaged) those who gained before, now gain three times more, 
and those who lost before, now lose seven times over. 
Base case simulations with immobile capital 
Capital (except for capital specific factors) has been treated until now as mobile across 
sectors. It is also interesting to consider the case where sector capital is fixed (at least in the 
short run). The additional base case simulations AS6-1 and AS6-2 below give some results in 
  18this direction. Thus, in simulation AS6-1 (base case) we assumed that all domestic sectors have 
capital fixed at their benchmark levels (Table 7). In simulation AS6-2, this immobility of capital 
factor is assumed for all sectors (domestic and export). 
It can be seen from Table 7 that, in comparison with the base case simulation, the welfare 
effect (both at the national and the household levels) is insignificant (AS6-1). This is because the 
domestic sectors do not participate in exports, therefore these sectors (and, consequently, 
household revenue and consumption) are not much affected by the immobility of capital. 
As shown in the last column of Table 7, the effect becomes very strong if capital is fixed in all 
domestic and export sectors (AS6-2). Both household and national welfares decrease at least by 
half. The problem in simulation AS6-2 is that capital cannot move from the contracting sectors to 
the expanding ones. Therefore, in the former some stagnation of capital is observed while in the 
latter there is some capital shortage. 
To conclude, the mobility of capital across sectors is a very important determinant of the 
gains from tariff and tax reforms, as well as of household income and welfare effects. It has 
strong impacts on exports and imports. In the base case where capital can move from 
contracting sectors to expanding ones (especially export sectors), there is a rise of 1.02 percent 
in national income, whereas this figure is only 0.7 percent in the case of capital immobility. The 
overall household income and welfare gains are also twice as high with capital mobility. 
Comparison of alternative tariff and tax reforms  
We now decompose the combined effects of VAT and tariff reforms in the original 
benchmark. Table 11 reports the results of tariff reductions with equal yield revenue and various 
combinations of tariff and tax reforms. Contrasting columns 3 and 4, we note that almost all of 
the overall welfare gains are generated by trade liberalization, rather than the introduction of the 
4-VAT system. However, the poorest household group benefits substantially from the tax reform, 
given the less progressive nature of the original sales tax. Indeed, the tax reform somewhat 
  19offsets the regressive impacts of trade liberalization. When we then contrast the effects of a 
single VAT in the last column, we observe that the economy as a whole marginally gains 0.02 
points by going for a single VAT vis-à-vis a 4-VAT system. Interestingly, the 4-VAT system 
appears to favor rural households over urban households, particularly among the poorest. 
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H1U (poorest)  0.19  -0.22 0.27 -0.02  0.08
H1R (poorest)  0.21  -0.14 0.22 -0.17  -0.10
H2U -0.02  0.02 -0.05 0.13  0.04
H2R -0.08  -0.17 0.02 -0.22  -0.11
H3U 0.20  0.20 -0.01 0.41  0.13
H3R -0.01  -0.03 -0.01 -0.04  -0.06
H4U 0.34  0.36 -0.01 0.31  -0.04
H4R 0.21  0.36 -0.11 0.32  -0.02
H5U (richest)  0.43  0.41 0.01 0.47  0.05
H5R (richest)  0.43  0.50 -0.04 0.46  0.01
Sum over households as percent of base income 
EV 0.28  0.27 0.0024 0.30  0.02
CV 0.28  0.27 0.0023 0.30  0.02
Single VAT    4.80  3.48
Basic agricultural 
activities 0.00  - 0.00  
Other agriculture 
and mining  2.40  - 1.78  
Manufacturing 
and Services  4.90 - 3.56  
Hotel, restaurant, 
Tourism, wine, 
etc… 9.80  - 7.12  
Note: VAT rates applied to four commodity groups in the ratio (0:1:2:4) as proposed by the government. 
Distribution of sector-specific factors 
The sensitivity of the results with respect to the distribution of specific factors among 
sectors is also verified by running different model simulations (not reported here). The shares 
used in the central case model specification are based on the characteristics of export sectors 
  20and on the authors’ estimates resulting from various discussions with experts
7. Although the 
magnitude of welfare effects vary somewhat with the different distribution of specific factors 
among sectors, the main conclusions remain the same as presented above. 
Marginal excess burden of raising revenue from taxes 
Table 12 presents the estimates of the marginal social cost associated with the use of 
alternative tax financing vehicles available in Vietnam that could potentially be used to raise 
additional government revenue. In this exercise, we marginally increase government revenue by 
proportionally raising tax rates in all sectors. The marginal social cost of increasing revenue for 
each tax instrument is measured in money metric welfare terms calculated in terms of the 
Hicksian equivalent variation summed across households per extra Dong of revenue raised.  
Results indicate significant social cost associated with raising additional funds through tariffs 
(0.08 Dong per Dong) or commodity input taxes (0.03 Dong per Dong). The social cost of raising 
additional funds through a corporate tax is negligible (6.4E-5 Dong per Dong), which reflects the 
uniformity of corporate taxes in the base case equilibrium. The marginal excess burden of raising 
revenue from sales and factor use taxes is also low: 0.004 Dong per Dong revenue generated in 
the case of sales tax and 0.001 Dong per Dong in the case of factor use tax.  
The results from model analyses thus suggest small gains from trade liberalization for 
Vietnam as a whole, but with sharp redistributive effects against the poor. The impact of the 
introduction of the 4-VAT system on the overall efficiency of the Vietnamese economy is small 
compared to the tariff reform, which indicates the minor role of changes in sales taxes. Data show 
small variability in the sales tax rates (in the range of 0 to 20 percent)
8. In general, the rural 
population suffers more than the urban population, although the poorer households lose out in 
both rural and urban areas. The sharp distributive impact of the trade reform is due to differences 
                     
7 Useful comments were received from seminar participants at the Institute of Information Technology in 
August 2000 on an earlier version of the paper. 
  21in the expenditure patterns and ownership of fixed factors between the rural and urban and 
between the rich and the poor. The regressivity of trade liberalization would be even stronger if the 
initial tariff levels were higher. Results are somewhat sensitive to elasticity parameters but in a way 
that is consistent with literature and that do not substantively alter our results. 
Table 12: The social cost (marginal excess burden) of alternative financing vehicles for extra government 
revenue in Vietnam 
 
Marginal Excess Burden (Welfare cost (sum of Evs ) 
of extra revenue raised) of various tax instruments in percent 
Sales tax  0.39 
Tariff 8.19 
Commodity input tax  2.66 
Factor tax  0.08 
Corporate tax  0.006 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper evaluates the impact of trade liberalization using a small open /price taking 
economy model for Vietnam. The study focuses on welfare impacts on aggregate as well as on 
different household groups identified in the model. We also analyze the impacts of liberalization 
on output, export and import by sectors and on producer, consumer and import prices.  
The model results provide insights into a series of trade-related issues not often discussed 
until now in the economic literature on Vietnam, such as the growth opportunities for some sectors 
and the risks for others, as well as the increasing gap between urban and rural areas, and 
between the rich and the poor. The results also give - and this is thanks to advantages of CGE 
modeling techniques - quantitative evaluations of overall and distributional impacts of current and 
alternative trade liberalization policies. The results show that there is a modest but significant 
(close to 0.3 percent in terms of national income) efficiency gain to the Vietnamese economy from 
trade liberalization. This however, is accompanied by redistribution against the rural and poor 
                                                                    
8 Chan, Ghosh and Whalley (1999) estimated a larger impact from VAT reforms because their benchmark 
  22households in general. The richest groups gain, while the middle-income groups generally lose. 
The poorest households also benefits, but by half as much as the richest households. 
This reflects sharp differences in the impacts of the tariff reforms among different 
household groups and also between rural and urban households. Urban and rural households, 
even in the same income group, are affected differently. In every group (except the poorest) 
urban people benefit more from tariff reduction than rural people. In particular, in the middle-
income group, urban households gain, while rural ones lose. These differences in the impacts 
between rural and urban populations and between the rich and the poor are explained in terms 
of the differences in the expenditure patterns across households and differences in their factor 
endowments where the former plays the dominant role. 
On the expenditure side, rich and urban households benefit from trade liberalization as 
they buy proportionally more imported goods than poor and rural households. Two likely 
explanations for the differences in the expenditure patterns between the rural and urban 
households could be differences in purchasing power and the lack of availability of imported 
goods in the rural areas. Furthermore, imported goods cost more in rural areas due to the 
transaction costs involved. Transaction costs are high due to high transportation costs as well as 
imperfections in the rural market. Thus it is quite obvious that the benefits of trade liberalization 
to people located at different places are not uniform, particularly in Vietnam.  
Our sensitivity analysis confirms these findings. The welfare effects would be considerably 
stronger if initial tariffs were even higher. These effects also vary according to the allocation of 
specific factors between sectors and among households, although the main conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
Computations are also made regarding the marginal excess burden of alternative financing 
vehicles for extra government revenue, which the government might need in the future. The 
                                                                    
tax and tariff data show higher degree of variability in the range of 4 to 65 % and 0 to 34% respectively.  
  23results show that corporate and factor use taxes are the lowest burden source for additional 
government revenue, as these are relatively non-distorting compared to other vehicles such as 
tariffs, input taxes and sales taxes. 
The clear policy conclusion that follows from this modeling exercise is that unless tariff 
liberalization is accompanied by appropriate redistributive measures, the poverty gap in Vietnam 
is going to increase. 
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